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ContentsB
etween September 1998 and spring 1999 the Hun-
garian interbank money market was facing severe li-
quidity shocks. As a consequence, overnight interest
rates were showing higher variability compared to previ-
ous periods. This paper aims to reveal the underlying
causes of this market disequilibrium and also to assess
the experiences of the period from the viewpoint of mon-
etary policy.
The higher variability of overnight interest rates is
undesirable for central banks only if it affects the interest
rates with longer maturity. In general this is not the case,
but as deviations of the overnight rate proved to be per-
sistent within the period examined, the daily liquidity sit-
uation affected the longer-term yields as well. Economet-
ric evidence shows that variations in the overnight rate
were influencing the 3-month interbank rates.
Hectic changes in the markets liquidity position and
high variability in overnight interest rates were partly
caused by the Russian crisis and the modification of the
instruments of monetary policy. Furthermore, the defi-
ciencies of banks inappropriate liquidity management
also exacerbated the market turbulence. Analysis of
market data reveals several occasions when the partici-
pants of the interbank market behaved irrationally, which
contributed to the persistence of the liquidity anomalies.
Several factors might cause the operations of trea-
suries to deviate from rational behaviour. Both the inter-
nal regulatory framework of the treasuries within the
banks and the external regulatory environment  legal
and accounting rules  might hinder the development of
an efficient interbank market (e.g. the more widespread
use of repo operation instead of outright lending). Fur-
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Summarythermore it is likely that  at least in their current phase of
development  it is more profitable for a large share of
banks to spend resources on divisions other than the
treasury and especially liquidity management.
By shortening the maturity of its main policy instru-
ment from one month to two weeks the central bank
managed to ease the liquidity disturbances. On the other
hand, such a step could not, of course, solve the effi-
ciency problems inherent in the interbank market.
The author is grateful to the staff of the Monetary Pol-
icy Department and the Economic and Research Depart-
ment of the NBH for their helpful comments and assis-
tance.
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THE INTERBANK MONEY MARKET IN HUNGARYB
etween September 1998 and spring 1999 the Hun-
garian interbank money market was facing severe li-
quidity shocks. As a consequence, overnight interest
rates showed higher variability compared to previous pe-
riods. This paper aims to reveal the underlying causes of
this market disequilibrium and to assess the experiences
of the period from the viewpoint of monetary policy.
Section 2 briefly describes the main characteristics
of the development of overnight interest rates from Sep-
tember 1998 to March 1999.
Section 3 examines different aspects of the link be-
tween the behaviour of overnight rates and the monetary
transmission mechanism, and presents the instruments
that are used by central banks for smoothing the path of
overnight rates.
Section 4 presents empirical evidence to show that
from Autumn 1998 liquidity shocks influenced those lon-
ger rates that are considered to be essential for monetary
control.
Section 5 classifies the primary reasons that led
within the period specified to the volatility of the over-
night interest rate, which had not been experienced pre-
viously.
Section 6 deals with the efficiency problems of the
interbank money market: some elements of the current
institutional and regulatory framework significantly con-
tribute to the treasuries inability of fully exploiting the
market opportunities.
Section 7 briefly evaluates how the shortening of the
maturity of the central banks main policy instrument
from one month to two weeks affected the banks liquid-
ity management. Section 8 concludes the paper.
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1 | IntroductionAugust 1998 was a
pivotal point in the





of the Hungarian interbank money market. Substantive changes
were effectuated in the instruments of monetary policy, while at the
same time short-term foreign capital inflows ceased, causing a drop
in the permanent liquidity surplus experienced previously. The re-
sulting shocks in market liquidity posed a challenge for banks li-
quidity managers, who were accustomed to a balanced structural
liquidity surplus and to the rather comfortable set-up of the central
bank instruments. The new environment forced treasuries to revise
their reserve accumulation strategies and pushed them to operate
more active liquidity management.
market anomalies The banking system as a whole was facing the new conditions
of liquidity management with difficulties. One sign that showed the
anomalies of the interbank money market was the increased use of
the central banks marginal lending and deposit facilities. While dur-
ing the first eight months of the year the NBHs overnight active repo
instrument was effective only in January, from September until De-
cember there was need for overnight central bank lending in each
and every month. Such tendency can be shown on the deposit side
as well. From January to August 1998 there were only 4 days when
the volume of overnight deposits exceeded Ft 50 billion, while be-
tween September and December it happened 9 times. Furthermore
3 out of the 4 extreme cases of the first 8 months occurred at the
end of August.
increased fluctuation
of the overnight rate
The tightness of the liquidity situation was mirrored by the
overnight interest rates. Figure 1 shows that before August 1998
overnight rates followed a rather smooth path except for some few
peaks which occurred generally on the last one-two days of the re-
serve maintenance period. During the last months of the year, how-
ever, the overnight rate fluctuated between the upper and lower edge
of the interest rate corridor defined by the NBHs marginal lending
and deposit rates. Moreover, while previously extreme peaks oc-
curred only for one or two days at the end of the maintenance period,
during the last months of 1998 the overnight rate often remained on
the edge of the corridor for several weeks.
Higher interest rate variability is also reflected in the increase of
the overnight rates deviation from the main policy rate: in the latter
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2 | Overnight interest rates between
| September 1998 and March 1999period the measured standard deviation is 2.5 times higher than dur-
ing the first part of the year.
Market turmoil persisted during the first two months of 1999.
January was characterised by shortage of liquidity and by perma-
nently high overnight rates, while in February, on the contrary, there
was a constant surplus of funds on the market. Stabilisation of the
market conditions occurred only in March, when the maturity of the
NBHs main policy instrument was shortened from one month to two
weeks.
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Interbank overnight rate
NBH overnight deposit rate
Chart 1
The overnight interest rateF
rom the central banks point of view it is a crucial question
whether the alternation of the periods with tight and loose li-
quidity and the subsequent high variability of overnight interest
rates influences the efficiency of the monetary transmission mech-
anism.
the volatility of the
overnight rates is
considered to be
harmful only if it also
affects interest rates
at longer maturities
The operating target of the NBH is defined as a certain level of
the money market rates with maturities between 3 to 6 months. The
bank influences these yields through its instruments. The volatility of
the overnight rates is usually considered to be harmful only if it also
affects interest rates at longer maturities, i.e. if moves in the over-
night rates induce changes in those longer rates which are of primary
concern for the central bank.
This is certainly unfavourable as in this case the prevailing li-
quidity situation affects the dynamics of the central banks operating
target rates, causing an unwanted noise in the transmission mecha-
nism. As a result changes in the main policy rate are not necessarily
reflected unambiguously in market yields; the signalling effect of
rate changes might fade. Consequently, monetary policy is less ca-
pable of influencing investment and saving decisions, aggregate de-
mand and inflation.
It is often assumed implicitly or explicitly in the literature that
the variations of the overnight rate are passing through automati-
cally to the longer maturities. This is not necessarily true.
1 The fol-
lowing paragraphs attempt to answer the following questions:
 In which circumstances can overnight interest rate volatility
be considered harmful?
 When is it necessary to reduce this volatility?
 What are the instruments that central banks might use for
that purpose?
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1 Empirical evidence on the effects of the overnight rate volatility on the transmission mecha-
nism is rather ambiguous. Kasman (1993) used data from six developed countries between 1988
and 1991. He concluded that overnight rate volatility affected 3-month money market rates only in
Switzerland. Borio(1997)onthecontraryfoundthatin11ofthe12countriesheexaminedvolatility
of the overnight rates significantly influenced the variability of the 3-month rates.
3 | The variability of overnight interest rates
| and the monetary transmission mechanismTransitory and permanent deviations
two types of interest
rate variations Let us distinguish two types of interest rate variations. Variability of
an interest rate might mean rapid alternation of positive and nega-
tive deviations from a typical value  in the case of the overnight in-
terest rate this typical value might be the level of the key policy rate.
But it might also mean longer-term (positively auto-correlated) de-
viations to the same direction, which are followed by a reversion to
the typical value.
only permanent vari-
ability can be consid-
ered as harmful
If market participants behave in a rational way and markets
work efficiently, then high-frequency variability of the overnight in-
terest cannot be considered as harmful. Volatility affects the effi-
ciency of the transmission mechanism only if overnight yields show
permanent deviations from the level of the central banks key policy
rate  by permanent deviations we mean deviations that last at




On efficient interbank markets deviations of the overnight inter-
est rate are transitory phenomena that last only for a couple of days.
Such deviations usually result from short-term liquidity shocks. For
example such shocks can be caused by sudden inflows or outflows
to the governments current account at the central bank, or by unex-
pected changes in the demand for cash. Such events may reduce or
expand the overall liquidity of the banking system. If the interbank
money market works in an efficient way and the banks liquidity
management is forward-looking enough, such liquidity shortages
and surpluses can be resolved by altering the volume of the banks
time deposits at the central bank.
Let us assume that on a given day of the reserve maintenance
period the banking system is short of liquidity and overnight money
is available only for high rates. This does not necessarily mean that
this tight liquidity situation will remain for a longer period  a week or
a month. In an efficient interbank market todays level of the over-
night interest rates does not contain any additional information
about the level of tomorrow, as the overnight rate is determined by
the daily liquidity situation. This also means that we cannot assume
that deviations of the overnight rate will necessarily influence the




On the Hungarian market for government securities banks play
a significant role as investors.
2 Even taking this into account, it is dif-
ficult to find a rational explanation for short-term liquidity shocks af-
fecting longer-term yields. Someone could argue that in a govern-
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2 Thirty percent of the traded government securities is held by commercial banks and special-
ised financial institutions.ment securities market dominated by the banks it could easily hap-
pen that in times of liquidity shortages the banking system does not
want to use its scarce money to buy government bonds. This could
lead to a fall in demand for government securities and to a rise in lon-
ger-term yields. On the other hand, if banks consider liquidity short-
age to be a temporary phenomenon this behaviour is not rational. If a
certain deal on the government bond market seems to be profitable,
the bank should make that deal, irrespective of the liquidity situa-
tion. During periods of liquidity shortage  when overnight rates are
high  it is worthwhile to maintain a lower working balance on the
banks current account to finance the deal, and to use the averaging
facility for compensating the deficit later. Even at the end of the re-
serve maintenance period it is rewarding to finance a profitable pur-
chase of government securities from overnight interbank loans or
central bank credit facilities, as liquidity shortage is usually a tempo-
rary phenomenon that lasts only for two or three days, while govern-
ment securities are longer-period investments. In the case of tempo-
rary liquidity shocks, therefore, investment decisions can be sepa-
rated from liquidity management considerations. Thus, even if the
market for government securities is dominated by banks, it is not
necessary to assume that short-term liquidity shocks influence lon-
ger-term yields.
permanent devia-
tions of the overnight
rates might affect lon-
ger-term rates
In the above we were assuming that changes in overnight inter-
est rates are considered to be transitory phenomena lasting only a
few days. If deviations of the overnight rates are not considered to be
caused by some short-term liquidity shock, but by some more per-
manent shortage, then as a consequence longer-term yields can be
affected, too. If market participants are aware of the fact that liquid-
ity might be scarce for some weeks and overnight rates will be high,
then by rolling overnight interbank deposits it is possible to achieve a
higher overall yield than the yield of the central banks key operating
instrument. In such a case overnight rates might affect longer-term
rates through forward interest parity.
Generally speaking, the longer the expected time of a deviation
of the overnight rate, the more it can influence the longer rates. It can
be shown that a 23 percentage point deviation of the overnight rate
that is expected to last for two weeks can result in a 4050 basis
point increase or decrease of the 3-month rate.
the effect
of short-term...
Chart 2 depicts the effect of the expected length of an increase
in overnight rates on the yield curve. The thick solid line represents
the baseline yield curve. In case (a) the increase of the overnight
rates is caused by a short-term liquidity shock, therefore it signifi-
cantly affects only the very short end of the yield curve.
...medium-term... Case (b) represents the event when the expected liquidity
shortage lasts for a relatively long period  e.g. a whole reserve
maintenance period. In such cases the raise in the overnight rate
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THE INTERBANK MONEY MARKET IN HUNGARYmight affect the 136 month maturities through the forward interest
parity. The longer the maturity, the less it is affected by the overnight
rate deviation. Such a situation was observed on the Hungarian mar-
ket in November 1998. In that particular maintenance period the
whole banking system was suffering from permanent liquidity short-
age, due to having tied down a vast amount of reserve money in the
central banks one-month deposit in late October. During this period
the overnight interest rate exceeded the key policy rate by some
200-250 basis points, which was reflected in a significant raise of the
3-month rates as well.




changes on the yield
curve
Case (c) stands for the event when the rise in the overnight rate
signals a once-for-all raise in the level of interest rates. This happens
only in extreme circumstances, as shifts in the yield curve usually do
not appear first with the overnight maturity, but generally result from
a change in the central banks main policy rate. A good example of
this rare situation was observed in September 1998. As a conse-
quence of the Russian crisis the Hungarian forint reached the lower
edge of the intervention band. The market was expecting an increase
in the key policy rate, but the NBH did not make that move for a rela-
tively long period. The overnight rate rose to the ceiling of the over-
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3Bythattimethepermanentliquidityshockwasnotmainlyduetorandomshocksbutitresulted






The effect of an increase in the overnight rates on the yield curve
with different market expectationsnight interest rate corridor, and the market was expecting the NBH to
shift the whole corridor upwards. All benchmark yields followed the
rise in the overnight maturity, raising the whole yield curve to a
higher level.
To conclude, it can be said that variations in the overnight rate
per se do not weaken the efficiency of the monetary transmission
mechanism. Variability can be considered harmful only if it is paired
with permanent deviations, i.e. when liquidity shocks die out slowly,
keeping the overnight interest rates on the upper or lower edge of the
interest rate corridor for a relatively long time.
Overnight rates
and the expectations about the central banks
key policy rate: pivoting
the effect of market
expectations concern-
ing the central banks
rate changes
The above analysis implicitly assumes most of the times that the
level of the central banks key policy rate is constant, or at least
market participants do not expect changes in the central bank rates.
If we take into account the effects of market expectations concern-
ing the central banks rate changes, we can find a reason that can
explain some permanent deviations of the overnight rates. As will
be shown in this section, these sort of deviations can be considered
harmful only if the banking system does not take the liquidity effects
of its speculative strategy into consideration when speculating in re-




The central bank can influence longer-term yields through fix-
ing the rate at a relatively short maturity and exploiting the forward
interest parity. If the central banks main policy instrument is a
1-month deposit, then the 3-month risk-free yield should be equal to
the expected yield on rolling over 3 times the central banks 1-month
instrument. As a consequence, if the market expects the central
bank rate to be constant in the next 3 months, then the nominal yield
of the 3-month risk-free bill must slightly exceed the policy rate to
take compounding into account. If the market generally expects a
rate cut, then the 3-month rate is usually lower than the policy rate
(the short end of the yield curve is downward sloping). This is be-
cause the reinvestment in the central banks deposit facility is ex-
pected to occur at a lower rate than the actual one.
rate cut expectations:
pivoting
If the market assigns a high probability to a rate cut, then the
yield curve usually turns around the maturity that corresponds to the
expected time of the rate cut. This is called pivoting. If the central
bank is using a standing facility with a maturity that exceeds the ex-
pected time of the rate cut, then the pivoting occurs around the date
14 NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY
THE INTERBANK MONEY MARKET IN HUNGARYcorresponding to the expected time of the rate cut plus the maturity
of the central banks instrument.
4 The reason behind the pivoting is
that market participants are trying to exploit the price reactions that
follow the change in the policy rate. If the yield curve is expected to
shift downwards after a rate cut, then the price of assets with long du-
ration will increase the most. The longer the duration of a portfolio,
the higher the gain it yields after a parallel downward shift in the yield
curve. Knowing that, when a rate cut is expected, market partici-
pants try to purchase fixed-income securities with longer maturities,
which leads to a drop in long-term rates even before the rate cut oc-
curs. The efficiency of this speculation strategy can be increased if
someone uses short-term  e.g. interbank  loans to finance its pur-
chases, knowing that after the rate cut occurs, short-term yields will
decrease as well and he/she will be able to finance his or her
long-run investments by cheap, short-term loans. Thus when the
market expects a rate cut, the demand for short-term loans in-
creases, pushing short- term rates upwards. When a rate increase is
expected instead of a rate cut, similar moves occur, but in the oppo-
site direction.
All in all, an expected rate cut leads to the pivoting of the yield
curve as longer-term rates decrease before the actual rate cut. If the
OCCASIONAL PAPERS 15





Yield curve moves when the main policy rate is expected to change
(pivoting)
4 For theoretical models about the pivoting see Schnadt and Whittaker (1993).central bank does not decrease the key policy rate, but expectations
about a rate cut occur from time to time, volatility of both the
short-term and the long-term rates might increase.
pivoting in itself is not
harmful...
It is important to emphasise that while in the previous subsec-
tion we assumed that moves in the interest rates were caused by ex-
ogenous liquidity shocks (e.g. changes in the governments current
account balance), the variability caused by pivoting originates in the
expectations of the market participants. Interest rate variability
caused by pivoting is not necessarily harmful; on the contrary, it re-
veals the markets expectations to the central bank. Furthermore, if
the market expectations are fulfilled and the central bank changes its
main policy rate, the pivoting vanishes automatically. If in such
cases the central bank attempts to diminish the moves in the over-
night rates by ordinary means  e.g. a narrow interest rate corridor
or by injecting (withdrawing) liquidity to (from) the interbank market
 such a move only gives further opportunity to market participants
for speculation: they gain cheap access to short-term liquidity that
can be used to increase the duration of their asset portfolio. If the
central bank wishes to reduce the volatility caused by pivoting, the
adequate method is to provide clear information about the goals of
the central bank and also about the expected policy measures.
...only if it comes to-
gether with excessive
speculation
Pivoting in itself is not harmful, nevertheless excessive specula-
tion on expected central bank rate changes can cause permanent li-
quidity shortages. Such a situation occurs when the banks, when
carrying out their speculative strategy, do not take into consider-
ation that speculation affects their future liquidity position. The re-
sulting liquidity shocks, contrary to the simple pivoting, do not die
out after the central bank rate change. In this case, although the
original move in the overnight interest rate was caused by pivoting,
the lasting disequilibrium of the market is caused by excessive spec-
ulation. Such excessive speculative behaviour contributed signifi-






Reducing the volatility of overnight interest rates is not a goal in it-
self. It is necessary only if moves in the overnight rate prove to be
persistent, as overnight rate volatility reduces the efficiency of the
monetary transmission mechanism only in that case. However,
some central banks are attempting to reduce the variability of the
overnight interest rate for a different reason, namely because their
main policy rate is announced at the overnight maturity (e.g. in the
USA, Canada, Australia etc.).
16 NATIONAL BANK OF HUNGARY
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market expectations through overnight interest rates. Variability of
the rates at the shortest maturity therefore spoils the signalling effect
of the monetary policy measures, as the market cannot precisely
segregate the intended effects of an official rate change and the rate
changes caused by liquidity shocks. Thus these central banks are at-
tempting to reduce the variability of overnight rates, minimising in
this way the chance that the market misinterprets the changes in the
policy rate. Within such an instrumental framework speculation
caused by pivoting disappears, as the short maturity of the central
bank instrument does not allow profitable speculation on changes of
the yield curves short end.
Central bank instruments aimed at reducing
the variability of overnight interest rates
reserve averaging An instrument that is widely used to reduce the volatility of the
short-term interest rates is reserve averaging. Averaging allows the
banks to not fulfil their mandatory reserve requirement on a daily
basis, but only on the average of a certain period of time (averaging
period or maintenance period). As a result, on days ending with
shortage in liquid reserves the bank does not have to ask for (inter-
bank or central bank) credit, but by maintaining a higher reserve
balance in the remaining days of the averaging period the bank can
compensate for the earlier shortages. Thus, despite temporary
shortages and surpluses, on average the bank is able to fulfil the
mandatory reserve requirement. Averaging is therefore able to
smooth temporary liquidity shocks, and as a consequence these
shocks are not manifest on the interbank market in higher overnight
interest rate volatility.
Smoothing with reserve averaging is more effective when the
reserve ratio is higher and the averaging period is longer. The reason
behind the former is that if the interbank clearing and settlement sys-
tem does not allow current account overdrafts (negative balances),
then large positive deviations from the mandatory level of reserves
cannot be offset by similar negative deviations, as it would lead to
negative current account balances. Therefore if the reserve ratio is
low, then large positive liquidity shocks cannot be smoothed out by
the averaging, and as a result these shocks are transmitted to the in-
terbank market causing a drop in interest rates.
5
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5 A similar argument can be asserted against those regulations that impose a ceiling to positive
deviations from the mandatory reserve balance. Similarly to the zero level of current account bal-
ance, ceilings on positive deviations are constraining the use of reserve averaging.The length of the reserve averaging period is also important.
The longer the averaging period, the larger is the puffer that can be
used by the banks to absorb liquidity shocks. A longer reserve aver-
aging period, therefore, allows the absorption of longer and/or
larger liquidity shocks. As an example, a liquidity shock that lasts
for ten days is unlikely to be handled by an averaging period of two
weeks, while there is a good chance that the banks can compensate
the missing liquidity in a system with a maintenance period of one
month. Of course there is always a possibility that the banks are out
in their liquidity plans by the end of the period; this is why the last
one or two days of the reserve averaging period are characterised
by intensive trading on the interbank market and by extremely low
or high overnight interest rates. This variability is not considered to
be harmful though, as the market participants are aware of its
cause and also of its transitory feature. This end-of-period variabil-
ity is therefore unlikely to affect longer-term interest rates, and as a




Another instrument that serves the stabilisation of overnight in-
terest rates is the overnight interest rate corridor. Besides playing a
prudential role as one of the key instruments of the central banks
lender-of-last-resort function, the interest rate corridor defines a
floor and a ceiling for the overnight interest rates by trimming the ex-
treme fluctuations in these yields. The smoothing effect of the inter-
est rate corridor is constrained by the fact that a narrow corridor
presents an opportunity for speculation on central bank rate
changes through pivoting. If the banks expect a rate cut, they can in-
crease their deposits in the central banks main instrument with lon-
ger maturity, while financing these deposits from the central banks
marginal lending facility representing the ceiling of the overnight rate
corridor. The narrower the interest rate corridor, the lower the inter-
est rate of the marginal lending facility, and as a result, the lower is
the cost of such a speculation. For a given maturity of the central
banks main (deposit) instrument there exists a minimal width for the
overnight interest rate corridor at which the banking system can ef-
fectively speculate for expected rate changes. When designing the
framework of monetary policy instruments, central banks have to
take that into consideration.
active liquidity man-
agement
A third tool which can be used for smoothing short-term inter-
est rates and interbank liquidity is active liquidity management.
When necessary, the central bank can affect the amount of overall li-
quidity available on the interbank market through open-market op-
erations (usually through tenders) in order to counterweight the ef-
fect of liquidity shocks. While the instruments presented formerly
 the reserve averaging and the interest rate corridor  work through
market automatism, active liquidity management needs discretion-
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agement requires accurate forecasts of interbank liquidity.
the NBH currently
uses all the aforemen-
tioned instruments
The NBH currently uses all the instruments mentioned above.
The primary instrument of liquidity smoothing is the reserve averag-
ing: the one-month maintenance period introduced in September
1998 allows a rather flexible liquidity management for the banks.
However, as was mentioned previously, some banks (or sometimes
the banking system as a whole) are often unable to take advantage
of the opportunities offered by the system of reserve averaging. The
reasons behind this originate in the lack of efficiency in the interbank
money market, resulting from certain institutional and regulatory de-
ficiencies.
Besides reserve averaging, the overnight interest rate corridor
is used for limiting extreme changes in the overnight rate. The ceiling
of the corridor is defined by the interest rate charged on the central
banks overnight active repo facility, while the floor is given by the
one-day NBH deposit rate. The interest rate corridor is symmetric
around the key policy rate. It has to be mentioned that in extreme
cases the overnight active repo rate does not provide a ceiling for
overnight rates, as the NBH imposes limits on the individual banks
(the limit size is proportional to the balance sheet size of the given
bank). In January 1999 some banks exhausted these limits, and as a
consequence the interbank overnight rates rose well above the corri-
dor. In an efficient market the overnight rates should have stayed
near the level defined by the marginal lending facility until all the
banks exhaust all of their limits. Those banks which still had unused
marginal lending quotas could have reallocated these funds to banks
whose stock of overnight loans had reached the limit size in ex-
change for a minimal margin. The fact that the overnight interest rate
could significantly exceed the ceiling of the interest rate corridor also
indicates that the interbank money market does not work efficiently.
In January 1999 the NBH introduced a flexible instrument
called quick tender which can be used for active liquidity manage-
ment. Until September 1999 the quick tender was only used twice.
Both times occurred in January 1999 in order to alleviate the short-
age in liquidity and to channel the overnight rates back to the interest
rate corridor.
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tions of the overnight





he main message of the previous chapter can be summarised as
follows: those changes in overnight interest rates which prove to
be persistent can be considered as harmful from the point of view of
the monetary transmission mechanism. These changes might affect
those longer-term (36 months) interbank rates and yields on gov-
ernment securities that are of primary concern for monetary policy.
BetweenAugust1998andFebruary1999overnightratechangeson
the Hungarian market were characterised with such persistency: the
one-day interest rate often showed deviations from the key policy
rate which lasted for two-three weeks (see Chart 1). It is reasonable
to assume that such long-lasting deviations could affect the 3 to 6
month rates as well, weakening therefore the central banks control
onthesematuritieswhichareimportantfromtheviewpointofmone-
tary transmission.
The validity of our conjecture can be tested by analysing the
data by econometric methods. The empirical analysis can be divided
into two steps. Firstly we have to define two variables: one that mea-
sures the disturbances of the liquidity situation and another that
quantifies the imperfection of the central banks control over the es-
sential maturities. As a second step, we have to examine the whether




were reflected in the
3-month BUBOR rate
A detailed description of the empirical analysis can be found in
the Appendix. We used vector-autoregression techniques to explore
the relation between the deviations of the overnight rates and the
moves in the rates at those maturities considered to be important for
the transmission mechanism. To quantify these latter we used the
3-month BUBOR
6 rates. The results fully support our conjecture.
While during the first part of 1998 the variability of the overnight in-
terest rates did not affect the BUBOR rates, from Autumn 1998 until
Spring 1999 there existed a link between persistent deviations in the
overnight rates and the 3-month BUBOR. When the overnight inter-
est rate remained at the edge of the interest rate corridor for a rela-
tively long period, it resulted on average in an approximately 10 ba-
sis point deviation of the 3-month BUBOR.
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n the following we will attempt to discover the factors that led to the
high variability of the overnight interest rates and to the persistency
of liquidity anomalies. Four primary factors could be identified. The
first one is the modification of the framework of monetary operations:
the timing of the changes in the central banks instruments tempo-
rarilyhamperedcommercialbanksliquidityplanning.Anothermajor
cause was the capital market crisis in September 1998, which led to a
robust withdrawal of liquidity through the channel of central bank in-
tervention on the foreign exchange market. The other two factors that
ledtothehecticliquiditysituationcanberelatedtotheseeminglyirra-
tional behaviour of bank treasuries. On the one hand, banks did not
properly react to the abolition of the central banks one-week deposit
facility. On the other, excessive speculation on the central banks rate
changes heavily exacerbated the anomalies of liquidity.





The turbulence of the interbank money market is partly due to a com-
prehensive restructuring of the framework of monetary operations
which took place at the end of August 1998. The main goal of the
modifications was to make the instruments of monetary policy more
simple and market-oriented than they had been previously. The new
instrumental environment gave larger leeway for the liquidity manage-
ment of the individual banks, inducing them to handle liquidity shocks
through the interbank market and not through central bank instru-
ments. The emphasis on the development of the interbank market
aimed to strengthen competition between bank treasuries: competi-
tion could improve the overall efficiency of the banking system and it
could also serve to prepare the treasuries for the tougher market envi-
ronment they would face after the country joins the European Union.
Among other changes, the central banks one-week deposit fa-
cility was suspended, while in the case of the one-month deposit the
permanent standing facility was replaced by a sequential standing
facility, available only twice a week. In the meantime, the reserve av-
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The introduction of the sequential standing facility with respect
to the one-month deposit instrument represented a move towards a
tendering system from the previously applied permanent standing
facility. The fact that the banks had access tothedepositfacilityonly
twice a week modified slightly the instrumental environment of the
bank treasuries, though in practice it did not represent a major
change, as the sequential feature of the standing facility could be
compensated through reserve averaging.
longer reserve aver-
aging period
Lengthening the reserve averaging period from two weeks to one
month allowed greater flexibility when handling liquidity shocks.
A longer maintenance period leaves more time to offset the unex-
pected liquidity surpluses or shortages, thus enhancing the banking
systems ability to accommodate liquidity shocks. Problems can
arise, however, if the system is hit by shocks of similar direction dur-
ing the averaging period, or if some institutional feature constrains the
operation of reserve averaging. In such cases large imbalances can
accrue by the end of the maintenance period, which, together with the
exhaustion of interbank lending limits result in extreme moves in the
overnight rates. However, on a well-functioning interbank market the
probability of the emergence of such situations is low.
abolition of the one
week deposit facility
The abolition of the one-week deposit facility was necessary, as
the central bank wanted to abandon its previous practice of deter-
mining the level of interest rates at two distinct points on the short
end of the yield curve. Fixing two interest rates with different maturi-
ties can easily lead to inconsistency, which can hinder the signalling
effect of changes in the main policy rate on one hand, while present-
ing an opportunity for speculation on the other.
Furthermore, the NBH deemed that within the new framework of
monetary instruments the treasuries would be able to perform efficient
liquidity management without the one-week deposit instrument. When
the reserve averaging period was two weeks long, banks used the
one-week deposit facility to transfer liquidity between the two averag-
ing periods of the same month. This was necessary as the income and
the expenditure of the government show a strong seasonality within
calendar months, and fluctuations in the State Treasury Account
heavily influence the amount of liquidity on the interbank market. After
the introduction of the one-month reserve averaging period, the cycle
length of the State Treasury Account fluctuations and the averaging pe-
riod became equal. As a result, fluctuations of the State Treasury Ac-
count could be handled fully with the averaging facility. Nothing justi-
fied, therefore, the maintenance of the one-week deposit facility.
It was obvious from the beginning that it would take some time for
the banks to accommodate to the new market conditions and that the
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transition. However, it was also rational to assume that bank treasuries
got to know the principles of the new framework in a couple of months,
which could have resulted in a more efficient interbank market and in
monetary control that takes full advantage of market forces.
Capital market crisis
the Russian crisis Since the second half of August 1998, together with the emergence
of the crisis on the international capital markets, the direction of the
capital flows induced by interest rate and exchange rate speculation
has changed. From the beginning of September until the end of Oc-
tober the NBH had to intervene on the foreign exchange market to
prevent the exchange rate from falling below the weak side of the
fluctuation band. During these two months operations on the foreign
exchange market reduced the overall liquidity of the banking sys-





As a result of these two effects  changes in the framework of
monetary instruments and the liquidity consequences of the interven-
tion  the banks liquidity management faced a new and unknown sit-
uation. The banking system, which rolled its liquidity surplus mainly
in one-month deposits, was shocked by the liquidity shortage caused
by the foreign exchange operations. As the pace of the liquidity drain
resulting from the intervention was faster than the expiry of the banks
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Exchange rate within the band
(left scale)
Chart 4
The exchange rate of the forint within the band and the foreign exchange in-
terventiondeposits with the central bank, the banking system as a whole was
short of liquidity and the overnight rates skyrocketed to the upper
edge of the corridor. The sequential pattern of the intervention spoiled
the original evenly distributed schedule of the one-month deposits: on
some days the banks did not renew their deposits at all, while on other
days exceedingly high quantities of new deposits were observed. Due
to the entanglement of the natural expiration schedule of the depos-
its, the shocks that were hitting the interbank market were able to
spread to the following months as well.
long FOREX positions
could not be used as
a liquidity buffer any
more
Prior to the Russian crisis the intervention on the strong side of
the fluctuation band provided a continuous and rather steady in-
crease in liquidity. By wisely timing their currency sales, banks could
manage their domestic liquidity position in a flexible manner, using
their long foreign exchange position as a buffer. Therefore they did
not fall back on funds from the interbank market or from the central
bank. The reversal in the direction of foreign exchange intervention
changed this comfortable position of the banks and forced them to
learn new techniques to manage their liquidity.
The effect of the abolition
of the one-week deposit facility
the length of both the
reserve averaging pe-
riod and the maturity
of the main deposit
instrument became
one month
The abolition of the one-week deposit facility made the banks li-
quidity management somewhat more difficult compared to the pre-
vious times. The maturity of this instrument was shorter than the
length of the previously applied reserve averaging period of two
weeks. As a result, the one-week deposit facility allowed the banks
to invest their liquidity surplus in such a way that in case of emer-
gency it could be used for reserve accumulation within the same
maintenance period. Following the changes in the monetary instru-
ments in August, the length of both the reserve averaging period
and the maturity of the main deposit instrument became one month.
Thus if the banking system tied down a certain share of its liquidity
in central bank deposits, those funds were no longer available within
the same maintenance period. As a consequence, if the banks un-
derestimated their liquidity needs and tied down too much of their
funds in the central bank deposit instrument, they could not correct
this miscalculation at a later point of the averaging period. Addi-
tional liquidity could have been obtained only with high costs
through the central banks overnight active repo facility.
the role of the
one-week deposit fa-
cility was to smooth
the monthly seasonal
pattern of the State
Treasury Account
In spite of that, the central bank was expecting that bank trea-
suries would be able to manage their liquidity position efficiently
even without the one-week instrument. Historical data suggested
that the bulk of the deposit stock be tied up in the one-month deposit
instrument anyway. The stock of the one-week deposit was low, but
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the banks used the one-week deposit to transfer liquidity between
the two reserve maintenance periods of the same calendar month
(and sometimes also to speculate on changes in the policy rates).
The transfer of funds was necessary because of the monthly sea-
sonal pattern of the State Treasury Account. As tax payments are
due in the second half of each month, the first maintenance period
was characterised by higher liquidity, while the second was usually




It seemed that the role of the one-week deposit was bound to the
smoothing of the liquidity cycles caused by the State Treasury Ac-
count. Since in the newly introduced framework the length of the re-
serve averaging period was one month  the same as the cycle length
of the State Treasury Account fluctuations  the liquidity transfer was
not necessary anymore. The logical reaction of the bank treasuries
would have been to increase their reserve balances by the average
amount of their previous stock of one-week deposit. With proper li-
quidity planning the fluctuations of this increased amount of liquidity
on the reserve account could have compensated the intra-month sea-
sonality of the State Treasury Account. Taking all these factors into
account, the central bank assumed that the abolition of the one-week
instrument would hinder liquidity management only for a short period
of accommodation. To promote forward-looking liquidity manage-
ment, the NBH started to publish the reserve position of the banking
system (the overall reserve requirement, the aggregate amount of the
reserve accounts and cash holdings) on a daily basis. The dissemina-
tion of this data was aimed at giving individual banks an overview of
the reserve position of the market as a whole.
The banking systems reaction to the abolition of the one-week
deposit facility was not in line with the NBHs expectations. The liquid-
ity which become available from the suspension of the one-week de-
posit was not treated separately on the reserve accounts of the banks,
nor were the fluctuations of the State Treasury Account taken into ac-
count by the treasuries when formulating liquidity plans. As a conse-
quence, shocks resulting from the State Treasury Account cycles
were unexpected. All these components contributed to the extreme
overnight interest rate fluctuations in the period examined.
Speculation on the changes
in the main policy rate
the speculative activi-
ties of the banks and
the pivoting
The fourth component contributing to the hectic liquidity situation
was related to the speculative activities of the banks. When the mar-
ket expects a change in the policy rate it is natural to incorporate
this expectation into liquidity management strategy. This means
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duration of their portfolio in order to maximise the gains resulting
from the yield changes which follow a rate cut. As a consequence of
the expectations of a rate cut the short end of the yield curve
switches: longer rates fall, while the very short ones increase. This is
the so-called pivoting, discussed earlier in this paper. As the central
bank accepts unlimited amounts of deposits at fixed rates and given
maturities, the price of the central bank instrument does not change
with the market assets. This presents an arbitrage opportunity for
the banks. To make it simpler, it is worthwhile for the banks to in-
crease their deposit holdings before the rate cut, as by doing so they
can earn a higher yield on their liquidity surplus compared to the




When a banks treasurer makes decisions about increasing the
deposit holdings, he or she has to take into account how such an ac-
tion affects the banks future liquidity position. If the treasurer expects
a rate cut and increases the amount of the banks deposits with the
central bank, this move will also lower by the same amount the liquid-
ity available for a period equal to the maturity of the deposit instru-
ment. Let us assume that the bank at a given moment has just enough
liquidity to fulfil its mandatory reserve requirement, and all of its li-
quidity surplus has already been invested into central bank deposits
that expire evenly in time. If the treasurer increases the banks deposit
holdings just before a rate cut, he or she also has to decrease its de-
posit holdings just after, in order to maintain a sufficient liquidity posi-
tion. The treasurers other choice is to obtain the missing money from
the interbank market. However, if the whole banking system chooses
this latter option, it can lead to an overall shortage in liquidity and per-
manently high overnight interest rates. Thus if all market participants
increase their deposit holdings for speculative reasons and they do
not compensate the missing liquidity from the expiring deposits, the
overnight interest rates can easily stick to the ceiling of the corridor. In
such a situation the speculation can easily turn out to be unprofitable
for some banks or even for the whole banking system, as the cost of fi-
nancing the necessary liquidity  high interbank rates or the central
banks marginal lending rate  can overly exceed the gains earned on
the higher interest rates of the central bank deposits.
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Speculation on central bank rate changes  a numerical example
The costs and benefits of the speculation on rate cuts can be illustrated through a numerical
example. Let us assume that the reserve requirement of the banking system for a given month
is Ft 400 billion. The closing balance of the banks at the previous month was also Ft 400 bil-
lion. Furthermore, the banking system also has a stock of Ft 200 billion tied down in
one-month central bank deposit instruments, with Ft 50 billion expiring each week. We also
assume that the banks are aiming to maintain the even distribution of the expiring deposits.OCCASIONAL PAPERS 27
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The market expects a rate cut (with 100 percent probability) during the first week of the
month. The banks have two options. They either maintain the evenly distributed deposit struc-
ture or they can speculate on the rate cut by increasing their deposits in the first week, tying
down additional funds at the higher interest rate.
Strategy I.: Evenly distributed deposit structure


















































week 1 17.50 20.00 22.50 400 50 50   0.83  
week 2 16.25 18.75 21.25 400 50 50   0.78  
week 3 16.25 18.75 21.25 400 50 50   0.78  
week 4 16.25 18.75 21.25 400 50 50   0.78  
Pe-
riod II
week 1 16.25 18.75 21.25 400 50 50   0.78  
week 2 16.25 18.75 21.25 400 50 50   0.78  
week 3 16.25 18.75 21.25 400 50 50   0.78  
week 4 16.25 18.75 21.25 400 50 50   0.78  
Profit: 6.30
Strategy II.: Speculative deposit increase


















































week 1 17.50 20.00 22.50 350 50 100   1.67  
week 2 16.25 18.75 21.25 400 50 0   0.00  
week 3 16.25 18.75 21.25 450 50 50  50 0.78  0.22
week 4 16.25 18.75 21.25 400 50 50   0.78  
Pe-
riod II
week 1 16.25 18.75 21.25 400 100 50 50  0.78 0.17 
week 2 16.25 18.75 21.25 400 0 50   0.78  
week 3 16.25 18.75 21.25 400 50 50   0.78  
week 4 16.25 18.75 21.25 400 50 50   0.78  
Profit: 6.30
The above table describes the two strategies assuming a rate cut of 125 basis points and
an interest rate corridor with a width of 250 basis points. When applying Strategy I the banking
system invests the same amount  Ft 50 billion  into the one-month deposit instrument. Its
current account balance remains Ft 400 billion for the whole period. The banks do not use the
overnight deposit and lending (repo) facility; therefore its interest balance equals the revenue
from the one-month deposit.
When choosing Strategy II, the banks are trying to speculate on the rate cut, therefore in the
first week they put Ft 50+50 =100 billion to the one-month central bank deposit instrument, in-
stead of the Ft 50 billion that expires that week. The current account of the banking system
therefore diminishes to Ft 350 billion, and the reserve deficit of Ft 50 billion has to be financed
either from the banks expiring deposits or from central bank credit. Let us assume that theirrationally high
levels of speculative
deposit
Irrationally high levels of speculative deposit positions oc-
curred several times during the period examined. At the end of Octo-
ber a consensus developed on the market about a likely rate cut
within some days. The banks, having significant excess reserves at
the end of the maintenance period, largely increased their deposit
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banking system does not place any deposit in the second week, therefore the banks current
account balance returns to the level of Ft 400 billion. However, the daily reserve deficit of Ft 50
billion which occurred in the first week has to be compensated: the banking system has to
maintain a daily credit stock of Ft 50 billion in the central banks overnight repo facility for one
week. The cost of this credit operation appears among interest expenses.
The consequences of the speculative deposit strategy affect the next reserve maintenance pe-
riod as well. If the banks want to restore their original deposit structure with similar amounts
maturing each week, they have to renew only half of the one-month deposit stock of Ft 100 bil-
lion which expires in the first week of second maintenance period. The remaining Ft 50 billion
can be rolled in the overnight deposit instrument for one week and can be re-invested into the
one-month deposit facility one week later. This move restores the original deposit structure.
The above table shows the interest revenue and expenses for both strategies. On the one hand,
Strategy II yields some extra profit as the Ft 50 billion increment in the deposit stock in the first
week earns higher interest rates for a whole month. On the other hand, there are additional ex-
penses, too: the banking system looses the spread between the central banks overnight de-
posit and lending facility, using both instruments for one week. The extent of the rate cut and
the width of the interest rate corridor determine whether the additional revenue exceeds the
costs. With the assumptions used in this example the speculation is profitable if the expected
rate cut is higher than one quarter of the spread between the marginal overnight lending and
deposit facilities. (The table shows the break-even point: by assuming an interest rate corridor
of +/250 basis points and a rate cut of 125 basis points the yield on both strategies was the
same.)
This example simplifies some important aspects of the true market environment. The bank-
ing system has other alternatives to compensate for the missing liquidity apart from the over-
night repo facility, for example by not renewing the one-month deposits on the third week.
This reduces somewhat the financing expenses of the speculative strategy: instead of the in-
terest rate paid on the overnight repo facility, in that case the opportunity cost would be that
interest rate earning that was not realised on the one-month deposit facility for one week.
However, this alternative strategy would further jam the evenly distributed deposit structure,
and the return to the original structure would invoke additional costs later. Furthermore, in
the example we assumed that the banks know with certainty the extent and the timing of the
rate cut. In reality uncertainty is always present, thus further reducing the expected profit of
the speculation.
Although above upper numerical example is far from being realistic, it still shows that the
costs of eliminating the liquidity deficit caused by rate cut speculation can be rather high and
might largely exceed the earnings. Furthermore, in this example we dealt with the banking
system as a whole, and as a consequence the cost of additional liquidity was the spread be-
tween the central banks marginal lending and deposit facility. If the speculation is carried out
by an individual bank, generally it may obtain cheaper liquidity from the interbank market,
reducing therefore the costs of the speculative strategy. As a result speculation might seem
more profitable from the viewpoint of an individual bank. However, if all the banks start to
speculate, then the interbank market quickly gets tight in liquidity, pushing up overnight in-
terest rates and the costs of the additional liquidity necessary for speculation.holdings within few days. As a consequence, a bulk of liquidity was
drained from the reserve maintenance period of November. In the
first days of the new maintenance period it became obvious that the
costs of obtaining the additional liquidity needed would highly ex-
ceed the gains that might be earned from a rate cut to any realistic
extent. As a consequence of the liquidity shortage, the overnight
rates stuck to the ceiling of the interest rate corridor for the whole
month, pushing up the cost of short-term liquidity.
the banks did not
take full advantage of
the reserve averaging
facility
The situation was further exacerbated by the fact that the banks
did not take full advantage of the reserve averaging facility. Those
banks which had excessive deposit holdings due to expire at the end
of the month did not provide interbank credit for the others with a
shortage of liquidity, although they could have done so. Conse-
quently, in the final days of the reserve maintenance period the li-
quidity situation switched, and the expiring excessive funds were
placed into the central banks overnight deposit facility.
cyclical patterns in
reserve accumulation
In December the same process could be observed, but in the
opposite direction. After facing severe problems in November,
banks significantly reduced their one-month deposit volume. Con-
cerns about scarce liquidity were further intensified by the worries
about the traditionally volatile cash demand around Christmas. As a
result of the low deposit volume the banking system had excessive
reserves throughout December. Then in January the scenario of No-
vember repeated itself. Expecting another rate cut, banks started to
increase their deposit holdings, which mopped up excess liquidity.
When in the second half of the month an unexpected increase in the
volume of the State Treasury Account drained additional funds from
the system, the overnight rates rose again and stayed high until the
end of the month.
the short memory of
the market
By examining the evaluation of the banking systems current ac-
count balance, it can be seen that speculation on rate cuts contributed
to the liquidity anomalies. The large deposit increases at the end of
October that led to the liquidity shortage in November are clearly ob-
servable. A similar phenomenon can be seen in the first part of Janu-
ary, although the unexpectedly high tax payments also contributed to
the tightness of the money market. It can also be concluded from the
chart that the market had a rather short memory: typically the treasur-
ies wanted to avoid the mistake they made the month before. After the
liquidity shortage in November banks got more cautious in the follow-
ing month and as a result they accumulated excessive reserve bal-
ances. In January, on the contrary, they returned to the speculative
strategy of November, while February was again characterised by
caution and a liquidity surplus on the interbank market.
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Deviation of the banking systems current account balance from the reserve
requirementthe low efficiency of
the banks liquidity
management... I
n the previous chapter we presented four primary reasons which
significantly contributed to the liquidity imbalances on the inter-
bank money market between September 1998 and March 1999.
These four reasons included the changes in the framework of mone-
tary operations, the market turbulence due to the Russian crisis, the
inappropriate reaction to the abolition of the one-week deposit in-
strument and excessive speculation. In the following we attempt to
discover the deeper causes lying behind the last two of these four
reasons. Several facts suggest that the banks liquidity management
did not work efficiently within the period observed; they did not fully
exploit either the profit opportunities on the interbank market or the
reserve averaging facility.
...weakens the effi-
ciency of the trans-
mission mechanism
From September 1998 several signs could have been observed
supporting the view that the interbank money market in Hungary lies
far from the theoretical construction of perfect markets. Sometimes
participants did not seem to behave in a profit-maximising way; arbi-
trage opportunities that seemed to be obvious for an outside ob-
server remained unexploited. These imperfections of the market are





On the other hand, aside from the transmission mechanism ar-
gument, an efficient interbank market is important for other reasons
as well. By taking full advantage of the opportunities of the interbank
market, banks are able to reduce the cost of funding, which leads to
an increase in profits. In a competitive environment this might result
in lower margins and more favourable lending and deposit facilities
for the economy as a whole. Furthermore, market efficiency and a
competitive environment are also necessary to prepare domestic
banks for the tough market conditions which will appear after Hun-
gary joins the European Union.
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secure the whit the
resserve requirement
fulfilment of payment
liabilities and to pro-
vide compliance
The banks liquidity management has to secure the accurate fulfil-
ment of payment liabilities and to provide compliance with the cen-
tral banks reserve requirement at a lowest possible cost. In practice
this means that a banks current account balance has to be suffi-
cient for payment operations on the one hand, and its balance, on
the average of the maintenance period, has to be higher than the re-
serve requirement. When necessary, short-term liquidity credits
and deposits of the potential surpluses are available on the inter-
bank market and also by using central bank instruments.
liquidity planning The basic time horizon for liquidity planning is the reserve
maintenance period: this is the shortest interval for which a trea-
sury has to have a concept about the expected evaluation of the
banks current account balance. A significant part of the changes
in the current account balance can be forecast with precision: debt
redemption and interest payments are known in advance. Another
part of the current account fluctuations can be estimated: the
evaluation of the current account balances of companies and indi-
viduals usually show a seasonal pattern within the month due to
tax payments and other regular payment items. Therefore, by
analysing either the aggregate current account balance or the
payment operations of the largest clients with time series tech-
niques a significant share of the fluctuations in liquidity demand
can be estimated.
strategy of financing Taking all these factors into consideration, on each day of
the reserve maintenance period a forecast for the exogenous
components of liquidity demand can be made. Naturally, such a
forecast will contain uncertain elements. The endogenous com-
ponents of liquidity, such as interbank operations, use of central
bank instruments etc., can be determined with respect to the
forecast in such a way that minimises the costs of obtaining the
necessary amount of liquidity. The optimal path of the endoge-
nous elements can also be influenced by the expectations about
the central banks key policy rate (speculation on rate changes)
or by the expectations about the banking systems aggregate li-
quidity position (effects of tax payments, expected interventions
on the foreign exchange market, etc.) Furthermore, the liquidity
plan has to deal with the effects of uncertainty: it must contain a
sufficient buffer stock for unexpected liquidity shocks. By ap-
proaching the end of the maintenance period the uncertainty di-
minishes. As new data arrive, the plan can be revised and modi-
fied if necessary.
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ple rules of thumb is
often sufficient
Liquidity planning needs significant resources and efforts
from a treasury: the methodology has to be developed, the flow of
data between the treasury and other departments has to be pro-
vided, etc. In banks where it is not possible or worthwhile to de-
velop such a planning system, the use of some simple rules of
thumb can also significantly improve the efficiency of liquidity
management. An example of such a rule is when the treasury does
not let the current account balance to fall below a level defined as
the average daily reserve requirement for the rest of the mainte-
nance period minus the amount of the central banks overnight
credit facility available for the bank. This strategy ensures that the
cost of meeting the reserve requirement ceteris paribus cannot ex-
ceed the interest rate paid on the central banks marginal lending
facility.
Mistakes in liquidity management:
some examples
From September 1998 the banks revealed several times that their
interbank money market activity does not always follow the rules of
market rationality.
use of the central
banks overnight
deposit facility
on the first day
of the reserve mainte-
nance period
One of the mistakes was the banks use of the central banks
overnight deposit facility on the first day of the reserve mainte-
nance period. On the first day of December 1998, January 1999
and April 1999 a significant stock of overnight deposits was placed.
It can be shown that such a move is always sub-optimal, as there
exists a strategy that leads to a similar result from the viewpoint of
liquidity, while being more profitable. Consider the case when the
main policy instrument is the two-week deposit facility. The first
strategy is to put an amount x to the overnight deposit facility. The
other strategy is to place 1/14 of x in the two-week deposit, while
leaving the rest on the banks current account. With respect to
profit the second strategy is superior, as the yield on the two-week
deposit exceeds the yield of the overnight deposit facility. On the
other hand, as to the liquidity position the effect of the two strate-
gies are basically the same. Although with the second strategy
1/14 of x is tied down for two weeks, by the second day of the re-
serve maintenance period the banks reserve requirement is dimin-
ished by 13/14 of x. All in all, the liquidity that is tied down for two
weeks is compensated by the reduced reserve requirement for the
rest of the month.
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overnight deposit fa-
cility and the active
repo facility is effec-
tive within the same
reserve maintenance
period
Another sign of the treasuries inaccurate liquidity planning and
the inefficient performance of the interbank money market is when
both the central banks overnight deposit facility and the active repo
facility is effective within the same reserve maintenance period. As
the banks have to comply with the reserve requirement only on the
average of the maintenance period, a bank which used the deposit
facility and another which obtained overnight credit could offset their
liquidity mismatch by an interbank money market transaction. The
two banks could share the gain that they could have earned by not
paying the rather wide gap between the yield of the deposit facility
and the active repo. It has to be mentioned that there were some ex-
treme cases when the same bank used the overnight deposit facility
and the overnight repo within the same maintenance period. It also
occurred that on the same day one bank used the overnight deposit
instrument while another obtained overnight credit through the cen-
tral banks repo facility.
excess reserve accu-
mulation
The inaccuracy of liquidity management can also be seen from
the fact that the banking system as a whole ended up with excess re-
serves in most of the maintenance periods. As the central bank pays
interest only on the mandatory reserves, excess reserve accumula-
tion leads to losses. For some smaller banks excess reserve accu-
mulation is natural, as the minimum current account balance neces-
sary for payment transactions exceeds their relatively small reserve
requirement. However, for larger banks more efficient liquidity plan-
ning could diminish the excess reserve accumulation.






The cyclical pattern of the banking systems liquidity position
and of the overnight interest rates that was observed from October
1998 has already been mentioned. The banks deposit strategy re-
sulted in liquidity shortages in one period, leading to high overnight
rates, while in the next period the banks became more cautious,
hence the market was characterised by excess liquidity and low
overnight interest rates. The fact that the banks did precisely the op-
posite in one period to what they had done in the previous one, and
did it several times, shows that the individual banks do not follow the
established practice; they do not try to go against the flow in order to
increase their profits. Market behaviour could be deduced from the
banking systems overall reserve position (the total reserve require-
ment and the aggregate current account and cash balance are pub-
lished daily by Reuters). However, apparently there are only few
market participants who incorporate this information into their li-
quidity management decisions.
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It some cases it is the treasuries inappropriate regulation and con-
trol that lies behind the irrational behaviour of the interbank money
market participants. Most of the treasuries are over-regulated in
some respects, while the control is too loose in some other aspects.
The banks management usually compensates the lack of treasury
control by administrative constraints.
the treasuries repre-
sent a black box for
the management
On the one hand, the treasuries are a sort of unknown black
box for the management, on the other they must comply with too
many administrative constraints. These two factors lead to a signifi-
cant loss in efficiency. Firstly, inappropriate regulation might create
incentives that are not in line with the profit-maximisation of the
bank as a whole. A good example of such a case is when, in times of
scarce liquidity, some bank treasuries were bidding with lower
amounts on the Treasury bill auctions instead of obtaining overnight
repo from the central bank. The reason behind that lies in inefficient
control: overnight borrowing from the central bank has to be re-
ported to the controlling bodies, while nobody is interested in the op-
portunity cost of not participating in a Treasury auction. Further-
more, in such cases the daily liquidity shortage is reflected in the
auction demand and in the longer maturities of the yield curve,
which is undesirable from the point of view of monetary transmis-
sion. As a result of the inadequate regulation, in some cases market
participants cannot take advantage of straightforward profit oppor-
tunities. On the interbank market security-backed transactions are
not common, and as a consequence the banks are imposing rather
narrow limits on their positions against each other. Naturally, such
limits are hindering the markets possibilities for efficient allocation.
inadequate incen-
tives
As the performance of the treasuries is seldom evaluated by the
profits they earn, but generally by some other measures, there is no
incentive to apply techniques that increase efficiency, e.g. for-
ward-looking liquidity management. This might be a reason behind
the sub-optimal use of the reserve averaging facility, and the lack of
techniques to forecast liquidity. In one bank the controlling manager
ordered dealers to comply with the reserve requirement on a daily
basis. In this case it is obvious that the controlling body is not aware
of the purpose and function of the reserve averaging facility, and that
is why daily deviations are punished. In such an environment it is
not surprising that the know-how necessary for the forward-looking
liquidity planning and for the conscious preparation for unusual situ-
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which must be taken into account when considering the conclusions. However, the author had to
use these sources, as in the time of writing no reliable resource was available on the subject.ations is not developed. On the other hand, inefficient control gives
room for abuses as well: treasury dealers might act according to their
personal interests instead of the interests of the bank.
minimisation of li-
quidity risk
Nevertheless it is possible that the current practice of liquidity
management is rational from the viewpoint of the banks as a
whole. It is possible that it is the minimisation of liquidity risk that lies
behind the limited use of the reserve averaging facility. It is also
likely that in the Hungarian banks current phase of development in-
vestments in both infrastructure and human resources have higher
return in fields other than liquidity management, e.g. credit risk as-
sessment, etc. This is another factor which might restrain the devel-
opment of the interbank money market.
the effective reserve
rate as a constraint
For some smaller banks there are other considerations that ex-
plain their limited ability to exploit the advantages of the interbank
market and reserve averaging. A significant part of these banks use
foreign funds as the main source of financing. During the period in
question the reserve ratio for foreign funds was zero per cent, and as
a result the amount of required reserves for these banks was rather
small compared to their average current account turnover. This is a
factor that limits the use of reserve averaging, as over-accumulation
could be offset only with a current account balance close to zero,






A certain segment of the banking system  some small, spe-
cialised financial institutions  has the policy of withdrawing itself
from the interbank market. Because of their size, for these banks  at
least for the moment  it is not profitable to maintain a complete
treasury infrastructure. Thus they limit their liquidity management to
operations with the central bank. Although their cost of financing
might be higher, this loss is still smaller than the cost of maintaining
a fully equipped treasury.
the slow develop-
ment of the domestic
repo market
The efficient functioning of the interbank market is also con-
strained by some features of the regulatory environment. A good ex-
ample of this is the slow development of the domestic repo market.
When performing outright operations on the interbank market, limits
that banks impose on positions against each other often become
binding, both with the overnight and the longer maturities. In many
countries repo operations (sale and repurchase agreements) are
used to circumvent such limit constraints, as they provide collateral
against credit risk. A more widespread use of repo operations could
significantly deepen the Hungarian interbank money market.
Current legislation and accounting rules do not promote the de-
velopment of the repo market. For the hold-in-custody repo, when
the ownership of the securities serving as collateral remain the prop-
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8 The NBH is introducing reserve requirement on foreign funds from July 2000.erty of the borrower, they are only deposited on a separate deposi-
tory account. Litigation rules not allow the creditor to enforce the
pledge. In the case of the delivery repo, on the other hand, current
accounting rules require the underlying securities to be marked to
market when opening and closing the repo transaction. This might
reallocate the profit between different points of time and between the
money market desk and the bond desk of a treasury, creating an in-





The phenomena described above bring a bias to the behaviour
of the interbank money market, reducing its ability of efficient liquid-
ity allocation. The market cannot fully alleviate the effects of liquid-
ity shocks, which might result in the variability of overnight interest
rates. Market imperfections also contribute to the spread of this vari-
ability to the longer maturities. From this respect these market im-
perfections cause an additional noise in the monetary transmission
mechanism, hence limiting its efficiency.
It is reasonable to assume that in the long run banks will allo-
cate additional resources to both the technical and human infra-
structure of liquidity management, and also to the regulation and
control of treasuries. This would certainly improve the monetary
transmission mechanism and also the profitability of the banks.
A significant potential improvement would be if the bank treasuries
were profit centres and if the performance of individual dealers could
be evaluated on a daily basis. Of course, initiating such improve-
ments is not a task of the central bank.
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and Tóth (1999).March 1999 : intro-
duction of the 2-week
deposit facility I
n March 1999 the NBH reduced the maturity of its key policy in-
strument from one month to two weeks. This change significantly
modified the environment of the banks liquidity management. The
experiences of this new instrument show that it significantly allevi-
ated the previous liquidity anomalies.
the new instrument
reduced the risk of
emergence of liquid-
ity anomalies
Liquidity management can be carried out much easier with the
two-week deposit instrument than before, when the key policy in-
struments maturity was one month. The new framework has an im-
portant feature: the funds placed into the key policy instrument at
the beginning of the month become available within the same re-
serve maintenance period. This enables the correction of the poten-
tial mistakes in liquidity planning which were made in the first half of
the month. If a bank expected a higher-than-actual liquidity inflow in
the second part of the month, and its current account balance is in-
sufficient to fulfil its reserve requirement, it can be corrected by using
the expiring deposits. The one-month instrument did not allow such
a correction; deposits placed at the beginning of the month could not
be used for reserve accumulation within the same maintenance pe-
riod. Furthermore, with the two-week deposit instrument speculation
on the central banks rate changes became less profitable, reducing
the risk of the emergence of speculative bubbles that might create li-
quidity troubles for the banking system as a whole. All these features
allow us to assume that permanent deviations of the overnight inter-
est rates are less likely in this new regime. Experience so far sup-
ports this assumption.
It is natural to ask what would have happened if the NBH had in-
troduced the two-week instrument in September 1998. It is probable
that it could not have helped to alleviate the overnight interest rate
variability in September and October, which was due to foreign ex-
change market turbulence and to the intervention on the weak side
of the exchange rate band. However, it is also likely that the extreme
deviations which characterised November 1998, December 1998
and January 1999 would not have occurred (or would have been
much smaller) if the maturity of the key policy instrument had been
shorter.
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7 | The introduction of the two-week deposit
| instrumentT
he period between September 1998 and spring 1999 was
a very useful period from the viewpoint of the evaluation
of the Hungarian interbank money market. The effects of the
Russian crisis and the environment created by the monetary
policy instruments enable us to uncover some malfunctions
of the market, which would be hidden within normal condi-
tions. It is likely that the liquidity imbalances experienced
during that time would not occur on an efficient market.
Beyond the Russian crisis, liquidity anomalies were due
to the changes in the instruments of monetary policy, and also
to the low allocating efficiency of the interbank market. The
long-lasting turbulence of the money market affected the
transmission of monetary policy as well.
The efficiency problems of the interbank money market
were caused mainly by deficiencies of the institutional and le-
gal environment. Better monitoring of treasury activities and
the modification of some regulations which constrain the de-
velopment of the market would enhance the central banks
control over those interest rates which are crucial for the mon-
etary transmission mechanism. They would also increase the
competitiveness of the banking sector. The introduction of the
two-week deposit instrument of the NBH alleviated the prob-
lems, but it could not correct the intrinsic deficiencies of the
banks liquidity management.
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ReferencesVector-autoregression analysis of the effect
of the overnight interest rate variability
on the yields of longer maturities
The data
T
o measure the imbalance of the interbank liquidity, the difference
between the daily average overnight interbank rate and the
NBHskeypolicyratewasused(ONGAP).Inordertoensurecompa-
rabilitybetweenthelevelsofthesetworates,wetransformedtheraw
time series into effective yields. We presumed that ONGAP reflects
well the liquidity shocks that hit the interbank market. In equilibrium
the yield of a continuously renewed overnight interbank deposit has
to be equal to the yield of the one-month (from March 1999
two-week) central bank instrument. Therefore, in equilibrium the
difference between the two rates has to be zero. However, if the sys-
tem is hit by a shock, this might increase or decrease the value of an
overnight deposit or loan, pushing the overnight interest rate away
from its long-run equilibrium level.
To create a good measure of the imperfections in the monetary
transmission, we choose the relation between the key policy rate and
the central banks operative target  the 3 to 6 month yields  as a
starting point. When the transmission is perfect, the key policy rate
exactly determines the level of the operative target: the two yields
have to be equal. In practice, of course, this almost never happens.
The difference can be considered as the noise of the transmission.
Taking these factors into account we used the difference be-
tween the 3-month BUBOR and the key policy rate (BUBGAP)a sa
measure of the imperfection of the transmission mechanism.
BUBGAP can be considered as the component of the 3-month




10 The difference between the 3-month BUBOR and the NBHs key policy rate might contain, be-
yond the noise of the transmission mechanism, some premia (risk premium, maturity premium
etc). We assumed that these premia are constant ocer time, therefore they influence only the level
of BUBGAP, but not its short-term dynamics.We divided the full time series into two sub-periods. Period I
lasts from 1 January 1998 to 15 August 1998, and Period II lasts
from 1 November 1998 to 30 April 1999. We omitted the observa-
tions between 15 August 1998 and November 1998, as the market
turbulence and the effect of the foreign exchange intervention would
have biased our results.
Descriptive statistics (Table I) show that the standard devia-
tion of ONGAP was much higher in Period II than in Period I. This
reflects the higher volatility of the overnight interest rates ob-
served from September. Autocorrelation functions (Figure I) de-
scribe the stochastic interdependence between ONGAP and its
own lagged values. It shows that while in Period I only the
first-order autocorrelation is significant, in Period II the
autocorrelation is significant for all lags between 1 and 8. This sig-
nifies that deviations of the overnight interest rate proved to be
more persistent in Period II than in Period I.
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Variable ONGAP BUBGAP ONGAP BUBGAP ONGAP BUBGAP
Mean 0.120 0.420 0.303 0.745 0.178 0.241
St. dev. 1.906 0.633 1.071 0.253 2.338 0.352
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ACFVector autoregression
We used a bivariate vector autoregression (VAR)
11 to discover the
effect of the deviations of the overnight interest rates (ONGAP)o n
the monetary transmission  on the component of the 3-month
BUBOR that is not explained by the key policy rate (BUBGAP), to be
precise. We expect that in Period I the deviations of the overnight
rates did not have a significant influence on the transmission mech-
anism, while in Period II the overnight rate deviations are reflected in
the 3-month BUBOR.
As a first step we performed a Granger-causality test
12 (Table
II). Results suggest that in Period I the deviation of the overnight in-
terest rates from the key policy rate (ONGAP) did not carry any
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Null hypothesis: ONGAP does not Granger-case BUBGAP
Period I (5 Jan. 199815 Aug. 1998) Period II (1 Nov. 199830 Apr. 1999)
Lag F-Statistics p-value Lag F-Statistics p-value
1 0.340 0.561 1 7.037** 0.009
2 0.228 0.796 2 3.192** 0.045
3 0.078 0.972 3 2.637* 0.052
4 0.063 0.993 4 2.246* 0.068
5 0.055 0.998 5 2.337** 0.046
6 0.048 0.999 6 1.921* 0.083
* The null hypothesis can be rejected at a 5% significance level.
** The null hypothesis can be rejected at a 10% significance level.
Null hypothesis: BUBGAP does not Granger-cause ONGAP
Period I (5 Jan. 199815 Aug. 1998) Period II (1 Nov. 199830 Apr. 1999)
Lag F-Statistics p-value Lag F-Statistics p-value
1 0.550 0.459 1 1.159 0.284
2 1.674 0.191 2 1.176 0.312
3 1.088 0.356 3 0.882 0.453
4 0.832 0.507 4 0.886 0.474
5 0.683 0.637 5 0.810 0.545
6 0.645 0.694 6 0.910 0.491
Table II: Results of the Granger-causality test
11 About time seris analysis with vector autoregression see eg. Hamilton (1994), Chapter 11.
12 The Granger test examines whether the past (lagged) values of variable A help to forecast the
current value of variable B (Granger 1969).additional information about the dynamics of the 3-month BUBOR.
However, for Period II the Granger test suggests a significant and
stable relationship between ONGAP and BUBGAP: the lagged val-
ues of the former variable help to forecast the latter.
The impulse response functions calculated from the vector
autoregression model show how an exogenous shock of one vari-
able affects the dynamics of the other variables in the model. Im-
pulse responses of the bivariate VAR on ONGAP and BUBGAP
(Chart II) give similar results to the Granger-causality test. The
charts in the lower left corners represent the effect of the overnight
interest rate shocks on the 3-month BUBOR. It can be seen that in
Period I the shocks of ONGAP did not influence significantly the
variations in BUBGAP. In Period II, on the contrary, the overnight
interest rates affected the lagged values of the 3-month BUBOR.
This effect was significant for the lags from 5 and 15 days. All in
all, liquidity shocks influenced the 3-month interbank yields, with
a delay of few days.
By taking the standard deviation of the ONGAP measured in
Period II we are able to estimate the scale of this bias. According to
the impulse response function, a shock of one standard deviation
(2.338 percentage points) in the overnight rates deviated the
3-month BUBOR by 56 basis points. This means that from No-
vember 1998 to February 1999, when the overnight interest rate
fluctuated between the two sides of the interest rate corridor, the
result was a fluctuation of +/10 basis points in the 3-month
BUBOR.
Variance decomposition provides information about what ex-
tent of the variance of one variable can be explained by the past
values of the other variables in the VAR model. Results of the vari-
ance decomposition can be seen in Chart III. The charts are in line
with our previous findings.
In Period I almost 100 per cent of the variance of the 3-month
BUBOR residuals is due to its own shocks. However, in Period II
deviations of the overnight interest rates explain around 40 per
cent of the variance of BUBGAP. Therefore, according to our VAR
model, deviation of the overnight interest rate was a major factor
behind the noise of the transmission mechanism.
The above analysis can also performed by replacing the
3-month BUBOR with the benchmark Treasury bill yield of the
same maturity. In this case the VAR model gives similar results,
although the statistical inference between the two variables was
not as significant as for the interbank yield. A possible explanation
is that while on the interbank market the banks are the only play-
ers, the participants of the Treasury bill market cover a much
broader range of investors. Non-bank participants of the T-bill
market are not affected directly by interbank liquidity. The shal-
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Chart II: Impulse response functions
We estimated a VAR with 4 lags. The lag length was chosen with likelihood ratio test. When
calculating the impulse response functions, the (ONGAP, BUBGAP) ordering was used,
however, changing the ordering did not affect significantly the results. Confidence intervals
were calculated analytically. The correlation of the VAR residuals (correlation coefficients of
0.136 and 0.108 for Period I and II respectively) was not significant.
Period I (5 Jan. 1998  15 Aug. 1998)
Responses to shocks of one st. deviation
(50 periods, 95% confidence intervals)
Period II (1 Nov. 1998 30 Apr .1999)
Responses to shocks of one st. deviation
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Chart III: Variance decomposition
Period I (5 Jan. 199815 Aug. 1998)
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BUBGAP variance due to ONGAPlowness on the interbank market, especially at the longer maturi-
ties, can also contribute to the difference between the two markets:
the lack of turnover does not enable the arbitrage of the yield differ-
ence.
We can conclude that the empirical analysis supported our
findings that from November 1998 liquidity anomalies of the inter-
bank market and the subsequent volatility of the overnight interest
rates affected the yields that are pivotal from the viewpoint of
monetary transmission, corrupting therefore the efficiency of the
transmission mechanism. This effect was obvious for the inter-
bank yields, but the T-bill market was also affected to some ex-
tent.
Long-run co-movement
of the time series used
in the empirical analysis
We used the VAR technique to analyse the inference between the dy-
namics of the overnight rates and the 3-month BUBOR. Before esti-
mation we subtracted the value of the NBHs key policy rate from
both variables. This was necessary firstly to create variables that
contain only the noise over the monetary transmission, and sec-
ondly to make our variables (covariance) stationery. As a result we
obtained the variables ONGAP and BUBGAP.
When subtracting the key policy rate from the 3-month BUBOR
and from the overnight interest rate we implicitly assume that both
the overnight rates and the 3-month BUBOR move together with the
NBHs key policy rate in the long run: the central banks rate
changes are fully reflected in the long-run path of both variables. The
existence of this long-run relationship  our assumption  has to be
tested econometrically.
Long-run relationships between the levels of variables are usu-
ally tested by co-integration technique. These techniques assume
that the variables are integrated at order one (difference-
stationarity). For one of our three variables the unit root test indi-
cated trend-stationarity instead of first-order integration (Table III).
This might be explained by the fact that within the period examined
the interest rate level was permanently diminishing (the key policy
rate was moved upwards only once). We needed therefore a tech-
nique that was able to test the long-run co-movement, no matter
what the level of integration of the variables.
As opposed to the traditional co-integration tests, the tech-
nique of Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) is able to test the existence
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when the level of integration of the variables is not known. In the case
of two variables the test requires the estimate of the following equa-
tion:
DS D S D xx y x y tt t i
p
xi t i i
p
yi t i =+ + + + + -- = - = - ab b g g 2 11 1 1 1 ,, dDyt , (A1)
where x and y are the two variables in question. The parame-
ters of the long-run relationship can be derived from b1 and b2.
Pesaran, Shin and Smith propose two test statistics for the exis-
tence of the long-run relationship. The first one is an F-test with
the restriction of b1=b2=0, the other is the t-statistics of the param-
eter b1. Both tests have two critical values. The lower critical value
was calculated with the assumption of both variables being sta-
tionary, while the upper is valid if both are integrated at order one.
If the value of the test statistics is less than the lower critical value,
then the null hypothesis of the non-existence of the long-run rela-
tionship is accepted. If the test statistics lies between the two criti-
cal values, then it is not possible to decide about the long-run rela-
tionship without knowing the order of integration of the two vari-
ables. If the test statistic exceeds the higher critical value, then the
null can be rejected. Hence there is co-movement between the
level of the two variables. Pesaran, Shin and Smith calculated the
critical values for both the F and the t-test.
Table IV contains the OLS estimate results for equation (A1).
The overnight interest rate and the 3-month BUBOR was substi-
tuted into variable x, while the key policy rate was substituted
into y.
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Table III: Unit root tests for the 3-month BUBOR, the NBHs key policy
rate and the overnight interbank rate
13
Variable Trend Constans Lag ADF Critical
value (5%)
3-month BUBOR no no 3 1.37 1.94
Key policy rate yes yes 0 2.08 3.42
Overnight rate yes yes 1 6.21 3.42
Period covered: Jan. 1998  Apr. 1999.
Number of observations: 334.
Results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test.
Null hypothesis: The variable contains unit root.
13 For the unit root tests we started with a broad model with a lag length of 15, and reduced the
number of lags until the last lag became significant. Similarly, we first assumed that the model con-
tains a trend and a constant term. If the trend component had proven to be insignificant, we omitted
it from the model. If in the re-estimated, reduced model the constant term had also been insignifi-
cant, then the model form without trend and constant was used.Taking the information criteria and the results of the
autocorrelation tests into consideration, a lag length of p=8 was
used.
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Coeff. Est. value St. error T-value Coeff. Est. value St. error T-value
a 0.102 0.121 0.841 a 0.227 0.678 0.334
b1 0.062 0.016 3.787 b1 0.207 0.037 5.470
b2 0.056 0.016 3.359 b2 0.192 0.051 3.766
gx,1 0.399 0.055 7.172 gx,1 0.288 0.056 5.094
gx,2 0.174 0.060 2.900 gx,2 0.051 0.054 0.939
gx,3 0.116 0.058 1.976 gx,3 0.016 0.054 0.300
gx,4 0.036 0.057 0.620 gx,4 0.060 0.053 1.129
gx,5 0.064 0.056 1.139 gx,5 0.052 0.052 0.990
gx,6 0.010 0.055 0.170 gx,6 0.055 0.051 1.080
gx,7 0.072 0.051 1.399 gx,7 0.103 0.049 2.083
gx,8 0.157 0.048 3.262 gx,8 0.098 0.050 1.960
gy,1 0.071 0.078 0.909 gy,1 0.566 0.434 1.303
gy,2 0.531 0.078 6.797 gy,2 0.313 0.435 0.718
gy,3 0.083 0.084 0.980 gy,3 0.359 0.439 0.817
gy,4 0.485 0.084 5.748 gy,4 1.301 0.439 2.958
gy,5 0.156 0.088 1.752 gy,5 0.603 0.444 1.355
gy,6 0.463 0.088 5.210 gy,6 0.131 0.444 0.295
gy,7 0.006 0.091 0.066 gy,7 1.042 0.442 2.355
gy,8 0.032 0.091 0.359 gy,8 0.178 0.445 0.401
d 0.098 0.076 1.284 d 0.372 0.436 0.854
R
2: 0.503 R
2(a): 0.47 D-W:1.998 F: 16.32 R
2: 0.233 R
2(a): 0.18 D-W:2.07 F: 4.91
x: 3-month BUBOR
y: NBH key police rate
Period covered: Jan. 1998April 1999
number of obs: 327
x: overnight rate
y: NBH key police rate
Period covered: Jan. 1998April 1999
number of obs: 327
Table IV: Estimated parameters of Equation (A1)According to the Pesaran-Shin-Smith test, the co-movement
with the key policy rate can be accepted for both the overnight rate
and the 3-month BUBOR. The test statistics for both the t and the F
test exceeded the upper critical values, hence our assumption can
be considered as valid no matter what the level of integration of the
variables.
For both the overnight rate and the 3-month BUBOR the sign of
b1 and b2 are opposite, but the absolute value of the two parameters
are not statistically different. This means that a z basis point change
in the key policy rate results in a z basis point change in both market
rates.
Finally a unit root test was carried out to see whether the vari-
ables obtained after subtracting the key policy rate  ONGAP and
BUBGAP  are stationary. According to the results the presence of
a unit root can be rejected for both variable. Therefore we can rule
out the problem of spurious regression for the estimated VAR
model.
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Table VI: Unit root tests for the variables BUBGAP and ONGAP
Variable Trend Constans Lag ADF Critical value
(5%)
ONGAP no no 8 5.59 1.94
BUBGAP no no 8 2.55 1.94
Period covered: Jan. 1998Apr. 1999.
Number of observations: 334.
Results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test.
Null hypothesis: The variablecontains unit root.
x: 3-month BUBOR
y: NBH key policy rate
x: overnight rate

















F-test 7.24 4.94 5.73 F-test 15.04 4.94 5.73
T-test 3.78 2.86 3.22 T-test 5.47 2.86 3.22
Criticalvaluesfora5%significancelevel.TheF-testvaluewascalculatedasaWaldtestwith
restrictions. The t-test is the t-value of the b1 parameter.
Table V: Result of the Pesaran-Shin-smith test2000/29 MNB Sü.